8-(D) - Repetetive proposals when denied
Pancake - last edited by Pancake
I see this together with 3-(N). If it would cost some sort of non-negligible fee to set up a proposal, an “endless” voting marathon should be to avoid.
In a free and open governance system everybody should be allowed to set up as many proposals as needed. Thus limitations doesn’t seem to be reasonable. Holding the community liable on voting on all proposals is not appropriate and could result in low voting participation. Thus there should be a way to prioritize proposals based on their “backing” by other community members. This backing can be expressed by donations of PART which could be assigned to each proposal, either by the proposer itself or other supporting community members.
“Prioritization by Donations” would increase the cost for successfull proposals since proposals with low voting participations shouldn’t be considered as “binding proposals”.
Any other opinions or feedback?
Couldn’t we just take the amount of votes as a natural parameter for identifying “significant” proposals?
With a system based on two voting rounds, this would be straightforward:
Every x months, let there be a short and fixed timeframe, in which new proposals can be published.
Tie a proposal to a fee in round one, in order to prevent spam/trolling.
Look at the number of votes x days after publication. The proposals with the most votes make it to round two, which is where the final voting takes place.
I’d preference that over donations. With donations, you could just buy your place on the list, right?
Multiple voting rounds is an interesting approach, also as a kind of solution for 14-( C). However, for me personally the possibility to vote represents also a kind of duty and responsibility to participate at the vote. This comes together with a certain effort to read and to understand each proposal.
In general I think we should keep the individual effort for governance as low as possible, while we also doesn’t want to have a centralized way of proposal “preselection”. So finally we should be prepared for many, many proposals in the first voting round (not now, but maybe in the future). Having a fixed “proposal fee” would help to eliminate most spam proposals, but it wouldn’t give a ranking on “important” or “less important” proposals. If there would already be some kind of “community support” possible (e.g. based on the proposals’ funding) it would maybe allow to vote only for the most important funded proposals and then it’s up to each voter to miss or downvote all the remaining proposals.
It doesn’t have to be the proposer itself who could fund the proposal. Other community members might also be able to put some “skin into the game”. So if one “bad” proposer would like to push his proposal to the very top, he would have to fund more than the whole community might fund for the other proposals. Thus it would establish a kind of competition for the top ranked proposal, tied to an economic decision making.
We could also come up with a funding threshold that each proposal needs to reach before it’s possible to vote on. I like the idea of a small funding as expression of the communities need to conduct a vote on the proposal, because having multiple rounds of voting may increase each individuals timely effort and may also result in low voting participation in the first round (if only the second voting round has been considered as the “important” one).
I know it’s not good when “money” decides on the place of the list, but thus we might eliminate a second voting round and can maintain a higher voting participation already during the first voting round.
Our approaches seem to have a lot in common:
- want anyone to be able to submit proposals to their heart’s content
- want votes to “cost a little”, to repel bad actors
- want some sort of “survival of the fittest”, in order to identify the most significant proposals
Would you agree?
The difference seems to me in how we approach the last point. You suggest to determine the winners by means of community support in the form of financial backing. I suggest to determine the winners by means of community support in the form of a first round of voting.
Would be cool to collect the respective pros and cons on this. What do you think?
Hey @btmr, yes I agree. There’s a lot in common
Sure, that totally makes sense to collect pros and cons on this. Although if it’s yet maybe not realistic, we could start collecting pros/cons based on voting usecases which represents extremes. Like,
1000 “spam” proposals and only one serious meant proposal
1000 serious meant proposals and only one “spam” proposal
100 nearly identical (similar) proposals (proposer just used different wordings)
100 inherently contradictious proposals (e.g. two contradictious proposals might get accepted with the same voting)
1 bad acting proposer wants to damage the project, when
a) community is very active with high voting participation
b) community is very lazy with few voting participation
1 bad acting whale wants to damage the project, by
a) preventing good improvement proposals
b) supporting bad improvement proposals
yeah, good idea to look at the fringe cases for this.
I’ll collect my thoughts and put a pro/con list in here.
I first wanted to put down general pros and cons of my preferred “strategy”:
unlimited but fee-based proposals that are evaluated in two voting-rounds, with fixed publishing- and voting-phases:
[+] Fees for proposals discourages spam
[+] Fees for votes encourages responsible voting
[+] Fees can be used to control quantity and quality of proposals:
high fee -> fewer but more thought- out proposals
low fee -> more proposals by a wider set of community members
[+] Rounds-based competition for “the best idea” is already proven in practice (e.g. architecture)
[+] Rounds-based system allows to scale the effort for the proposal: submit a short outline in round one and then flesh it out in round two
[+] Fixed publishing and voting phases means that you don’t have to constantly try to keep up with new proposals.
[+] Selecting proposals based on the number of votes is directly representative of community support
[+] Selecting proposals based on the number of votes is easy to understand
[–] Fees for proposals can keep people from submitting proposals
[–] Fees for votes can keep people from voting
[–] Rounds-based process is time-consuming: people have to to read and vote twice until the winners are selected
[–] Establishing and settling one a voting mechanism is not an easy task. How should voting power be calculated and distributed?
So now that’s out of my system.
Thinking about your suggestions above, I am wondering: what’s really the difference between ranking proposals by vote and ranking proposals by financial backing?
We both suggest a competition. In my case, submitters will compete for votes (by discussing proposals on Discord/Telegram/Forum/Medium or whatever) and in your case, they will ask for donations. If every vote is tied to a fee, as I strongly suggest, both approaches basically come down to the same thing.
So the main question is probably this: Should governance of proposals be free or not?
If it’s not free, what do we use the fees/funds for?
If we think that proposals should be tied to fees/funds, deciding between your suggestion and mine looks more like a matter of taste than principle.
Well, give or take the voting rounds…
Sorry for my late reply, and thanks for your thorough pro/cons list.
I agree that we both are very close in terms of the underlaying principle of competition. As you already wrote, transaction fees or voting fees can also be seen as a kind of financial backing or as for having some “skin in the game”.
I think we should try to find a kind of solution which needs the least amount of user or community input to figure out a reasonable ranking. Maybe it would already be ok if all the proposers itself are figuring out a reasonable ranking.
Coming up with an entire second voting round would engage the whole community once more and might lead to lower overall voting participation (also for the final and more decisive vote). Having the ranking based solely on financial backing, there’s the justified question on how to use those fundings. Based on a decentralized governance system it’s difficult to store the fundings on e.g. a multisig-address for maybe many hundreds of voters/signatures. So the only way I see to use the funding for, is to “destroy” or “burn” it afterwards.
This sounds frightening, but if everybody is aware of the fact that his proposal backing (funding) also wouldn’t be refundable for the proposal itself anymore, the financial backing would represent a rather “symbolic” support and only very little amounts should help to push up the corresponding proposals’ ranking.
Instead of “burning” the coins, we also could redistribute them afterwards with the ordinary staking rewards or use them for incentives or as @dadon once proposed as a kind of lottery for marketplace users.
Since for issue 5-(B) it worked pretty well to come up with a combination of both voting mechanisms, I tried this time as well to come up with an idea to satisfy both our needs
1.) To express the importance of the need for voting for a proposal, it’s necessary to put some “skin into the game” (Sitg).
2.) There are three possibilities to have Sitg :
- max. Sitg: financial backing which gets “burned” afterward (total loss of funds) —> maxRanking
- medium Sitg: having funds locked for a certain amount of time (loss of potential staking rewards) —> medRanking
- min. Sitg: voting by outgoing transaction (only loss of transaction fees) —> minRanking
3.) Rather than to decide for one of those 3 possibilities, we could make use of a mix of all those three “Sitg-Rankings”. Meaning, if needed, you can back your proposal by all three possibilities. You could provide funds which get “burned” or “redestributed” afterwards, you can lock some of your coins to support your proposal (amount * nb. of locked blocks) or you just vote with some of your public balances by an outgoing transaction (weight of votings e.g. calculated by “tx-fee * total balance moved”). Each proposal will then be ranked in each Sitg-category.
4.) The rankings of each proposal in each category will then be used to calculate the overall ranking based on some weighting factors.
For example: (3 x maxRanking + 2 x medRanking + 1 x minRanking) / 6 = overallRanking (for each proposal)
5.) The overallRanking at the end of the “proposal period” then defines the final Ranking for the then coming “voting period”.
6.) Maybe there might be technical limitations for doing onchain-voting on a very, very large numbers of proposals. If so, we could limit the number of proposals to be voted on based on each proposals’ overallRanking. Otherwise we could use the overallRanking as order on how to display the proposals to each voter (proposal with the best overallRanking is shown up on top, then the proposal with the second best overallRanking, …)
7.) technical realisation:
Each propsal gets a certain particl address assigned to, where:
- funds can be send for “burning”
- funds can be send for being “locked”
- outgoing transactions can be send
After the end of the proposal period (once overallRanking has been established), the “locked” funds are becoming released and all the other fundings are going to be “burned” or redistributed.
Each proposals’ individual particl address could be seen as the proposals’ ID and the calculation of the overallRanking position of each proposal would be done by a smart contract.
At the end of the voting period a smart contract would also do the final calculation of the voting results (based on the voting-transactions being done by the voters during the final voting period --> see also 5-(B) or 7-(A)).
I’m not an expert on blockchain, but since smart contracts sounds so smart it shouldn’t be a problem to delegate some voting analysis to them as well
(So I hope this also would be technically feasible)
What do you think?
Ok, then let’s get rid of that damn second round for now ;-). From your input, I could see two paths emerge:
One round of voting. A vote is carried out through an outgoing transaction to a specific address, with a fixed amount of part. Ranking is determined by counting the total of these transactions. The account balance is redistributed or burned in some way, in order to make it expensive to commit voting fraud.
Just like “Simple” but with the possibility of additional funding for each proposal.
The ranking is then done by looking at two addreses per proposal: a voting balance and a funding balance. Both are weighted in some form, so that one does not overpower the other.
Main question remaining: what is the benefit of additional funding?
If you worry about participation, “A” is the way to go imo. Start simple and then develop a more sophisticated process.
Ok, then let’s get rid of that damn second round for now
Only to make sure we talk of the same voting causes. During final “voting period” there’s a “second” vote done by stake voting and outgoing transaction voting. During “proposal period” I still would do some preliminary selection or ranking, also based on a kind of voting (either funding or number of outgoing transactions), thus making it easier during “voting period” to distinguish between serious and spam proposals. Maybe you as voter during the “voting period” have only limited time and thus want only voting for the top 5 proposals and so ignoring the remaining x-hundred proposals.
The benefit of funding I see in the increased amount of “skin” you can put into the game
If you or any other community member think your proposal is really important to make a decision on, you can support it in an easy way with a significant amount of PART by one single transactions to the proposals specific address. When doing this by outgoing transactions with a fixed amount, you might have to send many transactions to signal your opinion of a high importance for this specific proposal.
I agree, if one kind of ranking would be sufficient, it would be easier when not having the need for weighting in some form.
Have a nice weekend