@C-Skywalker I wanted to buy one more ticket, and I had anon balance for one more ticket, now there is a pack of 5 tickets and this converting what is necessary to make the purchase with the new amount
Here’s an answer @kewde gave on July 10th 2020 in regards to this topic on discord:
A: No
PoS is made out to be contradictory because it motivates holding coins in the public circuit while the privacy benefits the most of having many potential RingCT outputs in the system. But the only correct statement you can make is that the system benefits from having lots of potential RingCT outputs available to mix with, but to take it further and say that “the system benefits from having lots of balances stored in RingCT outputs” isn’t the same. Once a RingCT output is created, it doesn’t get destroyed from a third party perspective and it remains a potential mixin, and that’s the only counter that matters. The aggregate sum of funds in the public circuit can be used to calculate the funds in the private system, you could argue that the changes in this amount allow you to track abnormally large transactions (given that they happen in a relatively small timespan so you can attribute them temporally to someone) and that’s a fair argument but can technically be solved by moving PoS to the blind circuit and removing the public circuit as a whole. That way no amounts get leaked and completely eliminates any amount correlation attacks.
The problem is not related to PoS, although it’s being made out to be like that, the issue is rather the existence of the public circuit. Moving funds from the anonymous circuit to the public circuit does reveal the amount and can be used in a correlation attack, against you and others. But most of that risk resides in how you pick the inputs, a simplistic input selection mechanism may reveal more information than desired but as soon as you start having multiple inputs (> 1), the problem becomes exponentially harder.
B: Yes
C: Yes
D : Almost, anon2anon still generates a new potential RingCT input that can be used, so it is slightly better for the security of the system overal
@zaSmilingIdiot “Or alternatively, let the user unlock the wallet, perform all their necessary sending actions, and then lock it as quickly afterwards to ensure the full protection of the wallet again?” well Isn’t the only way to completely remove the need for the password to not encrypt the wallet at creation? if there was a way you could disable the password completely somehow and then turn it back on i would consider this even better then having a pin tbh but it doesn’t seem very safe or possible. but maybe I am wrong I am no expert on the matter.
“But assuming that this feature is then implemented in the desktop only, then this means that the desktop needs to temporarily (in memory) store the password, AND the pin: when the pin input is later used by the user and matched correctly, then the desktop needs to send the temporarily stored password to core. It needs the password to be stored, because it needs to send this to core to do the actual unlocking”. I can see why this could be worrisome security wise but is this not what happens when you unlock for staking if not cold staking ofc.
“Firstly, is this a core feature or a desktop feature?” i think it would only be really needed for marketplace features so I am guessing it would be a desktop feature.
@zaSmilingIdiot said in Projects that have forked or cloned Particl code for their own use.:
Ghost by McAfee?
we can add them when it’s really released and functional
@Allien said in [Bounties] Community bounties (Translations, Awareness, etc...):
Btw shouldn’t Bounties be rather a category than a single thread? That would allow anybody to post their own… (I know I’d make use of them, as before, hehe)
We could have one yes
